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Abstract
We study and compare the learning dynamics of two universal learning
algorithms, one based on Bayesian learning and the other on prediction with
expert advice. Both approaches have strong asymptotic performance guaran-
tees. When confronted with the task of finding good long-term strategies in
repeated 2× 2 matrix games, they behave quite differently.
1 Introduction
Today, Data Mining and Machine Learning is typically treated in a problem-specific
way: People propose algorithms to solve a particular problem (such as learning to
classify points in a vector space), they prove properties and performance guaran-
tees of their algorithms (e.g. for Support Vector Machines), and they evaluate the
algorithms on toy or real data, with the (potential) aim to use them afterwards in
real-world applications. In contrast, it seems that universal learning, i.e. a single al-
gorithm which is applied for all (or at least “many”) problems, is neither feasible in
terms of computational costs nor competitive in (practical) performance. Neverthe-
less, understanding universal learning is important: On the one hand, its practical
success would lead a way to Artificial Intelligence. On the other hand, principles
and ideas from universal learning can be of immediate use, and of course Machine
learning research aims at exploring and establishing more and more general concepts
and algorithms.
Because of its practical restrictions, most of the understanding of universal
learning so far is theoretical. Some approaches which have been suggested in the
past are (adaptive) Levin search [Lev73, WS96], Optimal Ordered Problem Solver
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[Sch02, Sch04] and Reinforcement Learning with split trees [Rin94, McC95] among
others. For a thorough discussion see e.g. [Hut04]. In this paper, we concentrate on
two approaches with very strong theoretical guarantees in the limit: the AIξ agent
based on Bayesian learning [Hut02] and FoE based on Prediction with expert advice
[PH05].
Both models work in the setup of a sequential decision problem: An agent in-
teracts with an environment in discrete time t. At each time step, the agent does
some action and receives a feedback from the environment. The feedback consists
of a loss (or reward) plus maybe more information. (It is usually just a matter of
convenience if losses or rewards are considered, as one can be transformed into the
other by reverting the sign. Accordingly, in this paper we switch between both,
always preferring the more convenient one.) In addition to this instantaneous loss
(or reward), we will also consider the cumulative loss which is the sum of the instan-
taneous losses from t = 1 up to the current time step, and the average per round
loss which is the cumulative loss divided by the total number of time steps so far.
Most learning theory known so far concentrates on passive problems, where our
actions have an influence on the instantaneous loss, but not on the future behavior
of the environment. All regression, classification, (standard) time-series prediction
tasks, common Bayesian learning and prediction with expert advice, and many
others fall in this category. In contrast, here we deal with active problems. The
environment may be reactive, i.e. react to our actions, which is the standard situation
considered in Reinforcement Learning. These cases are harder in theory, and it is
often impossible to obtain relevant performance bounds in general.
Both approaches we consider and compare are based on finite or countably in-
finite base classes. In the Bayesian decision approach, the base class consists of
hypotheses or models for the environment. A model is a complete description of
the (possibly probabilistic) behavior of the environment. In order to prove guar-
antees, it is usually assumed that the true environment is contained in the model
class. Experts algorithms in contrast work with a class of decision-makers or experts.
Performance guarantees are proven without any assumptions in the worst case, but
only relative to the best expert in the class. In both approaches, the model class
is endowed with a prior. If the model class is finite and contains n elements, it is
common to choose the uniform prior 1
n
. For universal learning it turns out that
universal base classes for both approaches can be constructed from the set of all
programs on some fixed universal (prefix) Turing machine. Then each program nat-
urally corresponds to an element in the base class, and a prior weight is defined by
w(program) = 2−length(program) (provided that the input tape of the Turing machine
is binary). The prior is a (sub-)probability distribution on the class, i.e.
∑
w ≤ 1.
Contents. The aim of this paper is to better understand the actual learning dy-
namics and properties of the two universal approaches, which are both “universally
optimal” in a sense specified later. Clearly, the universal base class is computation-
ally very expensive or infeasible to use. So we will restrict on simpler base classes
which are “universal” in a much weaker sense: we will employ completeMarkov base
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classes where each element sees only the previous time step. Although these classes
are not truly universal, they are general enough (and not tailored towards our appli-
cations), such that we expect the outcome to be a good indication for the dynamics
of true universal learning. The problems we study in this paper are 2 × 2 matrix
games. (Due to lack of space, we will not go into the deep literature on learning
equilibria in matrix games, as our primary interest the universal learning dynam-
ics.) Matrix games are simple enough such that a “universal” algorithm with our
restricted base class can learn something, yet they provide interesting and nontrivial
cases for reactive environments, where really active learning is necessary. Moreover,
in this way we can set up a direct competition between the two universal learn-
ers. The paper is structured as follows: In the next two sections, we present both
universal learning approaches together with their theoretical guarantees. Section 4
contains the simulations, followed by a discussion in Section 5.
2 Bayesian Sequential Decisions (AIξ)
Passive problems. Every inductive inference problem can be brought into the
following form: Given a string x<t = x1:t−1 := x1x2...xt−1, guess its continuation xt.
Here and in the following we assume that the symbols xt are in a finite alphabet X ,
for concreteness the reader may think of X = {0, 1}. If strings are sampled from a
probability distribution µ : X ∗ → [0, 1], then predicting according to µ(xt|x<t), the
probability conditioned on the history, is optimal. If µ is unknown, predictions may
be based on an approximation of µ. This is what happens in Bayesian sequential
prediction: Let the model class M := {µ1, µ2, ...} be a finite or countable set of
distributions on strings µi(x1:t|y1:t) which are additionally conditionalized to the
past actions y<t. The actions are necessary for dealing with sequential decision
problems as introduced above. We agree on the convention that the learner issues
action yt before seeing xt. Let {w1, w2, . . .} be a prior on M satisfying
∑
wi ≤ 1.
Then the Bayes mixture is the weighted average
ξ(x1:t|y1:t) :=
∑
i
wi · µi(x1:t|y1:t).
One can show that the ξ-predictions rapidly converge to the µ-predictions almost
surely, if we assume that M contains the true distribution: µ ∈M. This is not
a serious constraint if we include all computable probability distributions in M.
This universal model class corresponds to all programs on a fixed universal Turing
machine (cf. the introduction and [Sol64, Hut04]).
In a passive prediction problem, the behavior of the environments µi do not
depend on our actions y1:t. Here we may interpret our action yt as the prediction
of xt. Assume that ℓ : (yt, xt) 7→ [0, 1] is a function defining our instantaneous loss.
Then the average per round regret of ξ tends to 0 at least at rate t−1/2, precisely
1
t
Lξ1:t ≤
1
t
Lµ1:t + 2
√
lnw−1µ /t. (1)
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Here, Lξ1:t is the cumulative µ-expected loss of the ξ-predictions. The ξ-prediction
(and likewise the µ-prediction) is chosen Bayes optimal for the given loss function:
yξt = argminyt
∑
xt
ℓ(yt, xt)ξ(x1:t|y1:t). The difference L
ξ
1:t − L
µ
1:t is termed regret.
Active problems. If the environment is reactive, i.e. depends on our action, then
it is easy to construct examples where the greedy Bayes optimal loss minimization
is not optimal. Instead, the far-sighted AIξ-agent chooses the action
yξ,dt = argmin
yt
∑
xt
...min
yt+d
∑
xt+d
ℓt:t+dξ(x1:t+d|y1:t+d). (2)
where ℓt:t+d = ℓ(yt:t+d, xt:t+d) =
∑t+d
s=t ℓ(ys, xs) and d is the depth of the expectimin-
tree the agent computes by means of (2). We refer to t+ d as the (current) horizon.
If we knew the final time T in advance and had enough computational resources, we
could choose d = T − t according to the fixed horizon T . Taking d fixed and small
(e.g. d = 8) is computationally feasible, this is themoving horizon variant. However,
this can cause consistency problems: A sequence of actions which is started some
time step t may not seem favorable any more in the next time step t+ 1 (since the
horizon shifts), and thus is disrupted. We therefore also use an almost consistent
horizon variant which takes d = 8 in the first step, then d = 7, and so on down to
d = 2, after which we start again with d = 8. (Actually, we do not go down to d = 1,
since then the agent would be greedy, which can for instance disrupt consecutive runs
of cooperation in the Prisoner’s dilemma, see below.) A theoretically very appealing
alternative is to consider the future discounted loss and infinite depth, which is a
solution of the Bellman equations. This can be found in [Hut04], together with more
discussion and the proof of the following optimality theorem for AIξ.
Theorem 1 (Performance of AIξ) If there exists a self-optimizing policy ρ in
the sense that its expected average loss 1
T
Lρ1:T converges for T → ∞ to the optimal
average 1
T
Lµ1:T for all environments µ ∈ M, then this also holds for the universal
policy ξ, i.e.
If ∃ρ∀µ : 1
T
Lρ1:T
T→∞
−→ 1
T
Lµ1:T ⇒
1
T
Lξ1:T
T→∞
−→ 1
T
Lµ1:T
Matrix games (as defined in Section 4) are straightforward in our setup. We just
have to consider that the opponent, i.e. the environment, does not know our action
yt when deciding its reaction xt: µi(xt|x<t, y1:t) = µi(xt|x<t, y<t). AIξ for 2 × 2
matrix games can then be implemented recursively as shown in Figure 1, if we addi-
tionally assume that the environments are Markov players with two internal states,
corresponding to the reaction xt they are playing. Since in step t, we don’t know xt
yet, AIξ must evaluate both AIXIrec(0, x<t, y<t, d) and AIXIrec(1, x<t, y<t, d) and
compute a weighted mixture for both possible actions a = 0, 1. As long as we do
not yet know the loss matrix ℓ : (yt, xt) 7→ [0, 1] completely (which we assume to
be deterministic), we additionally compute an expectation over all assignments of
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function ℓ = A(s0, x<t, y<t, d)
ℓ0 := ℓ(0, s0), ℓ
1 := ℓ(1, s0)
If d > 1 Then
For a ∈ {0, 1}
For s ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ(s,a) := A(s, [x<ts0], [y<ta], d−1)
ℓa := ℓa + ξ(s|s0, a, x<t, y<t) · ℓ
(s,a)
Return min{ℓ0, ℓ1}
Figure 1: The AIξ recursion for known loss matrix ℓ.
For τ = 1, 2, 3, . . .
Sample rτ ∈ {0, 1} independ. s.t. P [rτ = 1] = γτ
If rτ = 0 Then
Invoke subroutine FPL(τ):
Sample qiτ
d.
∼ Exp independently for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Select IFPLτ = arg min
1≤i≤n
{ητ ℓˆ
i
<τ + lnw
i − qiτ}
〈end of subroutine FPL(τ)〉
Play IFoEτ := I
FPL
τ for Bτ elementary time steps
Set ℓˆiτ = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Else
Sample IFoEτ ∈{1...n} uniformly
Play I := IFoEτ for Bτ elementary time steps
Let t0(τ) :=
∑τ−1
τ ′=1Bτ ′ and ℓ
I
τ :=
∑t0(τ)+Bτ
t=t0(τ)+1
ℓIt
Let ℓˆIτ = ℓ
I
τn/γt and ℓˆ
i
τ = 0 for all i 6= I
Figure 2: The algorithm FoE . The parameters ηt, γt, and
Bt will be specified in Theorem 2.
losses which are consistent with the history. To this aim, we pre-define a finite
set L ⊂ N which contains all possible losses. In the simulations below, we use
L = {0 . . . 4} ∪ {−16}, where the actual losses are always in {0 . . . 4} and the large
negative value of −16 encourages the agent to explore as long as he doesn’t know
the losses completely. This is for obtaining interesting results with moderate tree
depth: otherwise, when the loss observed by AIξ is relatively low, AIξ would explore
only with a large depth. This phenomenon is explained in detail in Section 4.
Markov Decision Processes (mdp) have probably been most intensively studied
from all possible environments. In an mdp, the environmental behavior depends
only on the last action and observation, precisely µ(xt|x<t, y<t) = µ(xt|xt−1, yt−1) in
case of a matrix game. For a 2×2 game, a Markov player is modelled by a 2×2×2
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transition matrix. It turns out that the (uncountable) class of all transition matrices
with a uniform prior admits a closed-form solution:
ξ(xt|x<t, y<t) =
Nyt−1xt−1→xt+1
N
yt−1
xt−1→0+N
yt−1
xt−1→1+2
,
where Nyt−1xt−1→xt counts how often in the history the state xt−1 transformed to state xt
under action yt−1. This is just Laplace’ law of succession [Hut04, Prob.2.11&5.14].
(Observe that ξ is not Markov but depends on the full history.) Note that the ξ pos-
terior estimate changes along the expectimin tree (2). Disregarding this important
fact as is done in Temporal Difference learning and variants would result in greedy
policies who have to rescue exploration by ad-hoc methods (like ε-greedy). One can
show that there exist self-optimizing policies p˜ for the class of ergodic mdps [Hut04].
Although the class of transition matrices contains non-ergodic environments, a vari-
ant of Theorem 1 applies, and hence the Bayes optimal policy pξ is self-optimizing
for ergodic Markov players (which we will exclusively meet). The intuitive reason is
that the class is compact and the non-ergodic environments have measure zero.
3 Acting with Expert Advice (FoE)
Instead of predicting or acting optimally with respect to a model class, we may con-
struct an agent from a class of base agents. We show how this can be accomplished
for fully active problems. The resulting algorithm will radically differ from the AIξ
agent.
Prediction with expert advice has been very popular in the last two decades.
The base predictors are called experts. Our goal is to design a master algorithm
which in each time step t selects one expert i and follows its advice (i.e. predicts
as the expert does). Thereby, we want to keep the master’s regret ℓmaster1:T − ℓ
∗
1:T
small, where ℓ∗1:T is the cumulative loss of the best expert in hindsight at time
T . Usually, T ≥ 1 not known in advance. The state-of-the-art experts algorithms
achieve this: Loss bounds similar to (1) can be proven, with ℓµ1:T replaced by ℓ
∗
1:T and
wµ replaced by the prior weight of the best expert in hindsight, w∗. These bounds
hold in the worst case, i.e. without any assumption on the data generating process.
In particular, the environment which provides the feedback may be an adaptive
adversary. Since these bounds imply bounds in expectation in the Bayesian setting
(with slightly larger constants than (1)), expert advice is in a sense the stronger
prediction strategy.
In order to protect against adaptive adversaries, we need to randomize. In this
work, we build on the Follow the Perturbed Leader FPL algorithm introduced by
[Han57]. (For space constraints, we won’t discuss the more popular alternative of
weighted sampling at all.) We don’t even need to be told the true outcome after the
master’s decision. All we need for the analysis is learning the losses of all experts,
which are bounded wlog. in [0, 1] (this is an important restriction which applies to
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all standard experts algorithms). In this way, the master’s actual decision is based
on the past cumulative loss of the experts. A key concept is that we must prevent
the master from learning too fast (or to slowly). This is achieved by introducing
a learning rate ηt, which decreases to zero at an appropriate rate with growing t.
Most of the literature assumes experts classes of finite size n with uniform prior 1
n
, in
particular when the learning rate ηt is non-stationary. For FPL, the case of arbitrary
non-uniform prior and countable expert classes has been treated in [HP04].1
Active problems. In the passive full observation game discussed so far (i.e. we
learn all losses), the notion of regret is not problematic even against an adaptive
adversary.2 However, the situation changes if the reaction of the environment de-
pends on our past actions. Consider the simple case of two experts, one always
suggesting action 0 and the other one action 1. The environment is reactive and
“unfair”: Each expert incurs no loss as long as we stay with its initial action (e.g.
the action sequences 00000 and 111 have no loss). But as soon as we perform a
different action (e.g. 001), in all subsequent rounds both experts incur loss 1. Each
sensible strategy will soon explore both actions, and compared to the pure experts,
we incur large loss. Consequently, we need to consider a different notion of regret:
Our performance is compared to what an expert could achieve when he is actually
put in our situation. In this example, after the action sequence 001, we perform
badly, but so do all experts.
Another problem with reactive environments is that we do not necessarily get
valid feedback for all experts in each round. In the previous example, if we chose
0 as the first action and learned that expert 0 had no loss at time t = 2, it is not
legitimate to make any assumption on the loss of expert 1 at t = 2. Even if the
environment tells us that the pure expert 1 had no loss, we are interested in the loss
of expert 1 put in our situation, i.e. after the first action 0. But this loss we do not
know. Precisely, we know only the loss of an expert with the correct action history
after the last time step in the past, where we (maybe coincidentally) acted as he
suggested. Instead of trying to track the action history (which is possibly expensive),
we therefore use only the feedback from the currently selected expert i and discard all
other information. This is commonly referred to as bandit setup. Fortunately, this
issue can be successfully addressed by forcing exploration, i.e. sampling according to
the prior, with a certain probability γt [MB04]. This exploration rate γt is decreased
to zero appropriately with growing t. Thus, in each time step we decide to either
follow the perturbed leader or explore. Accordingly, we call our algorithm FoE
(Follow or Explore). Bounds for the bandit setup are typically similar to (1), but
1Given the large amount of recent literature, it should be not too difficult to obtain similar
assertions for WS algorithms. However, as far as we know, the only result proven up to now
requires rapidly decaying weights [Gen03], which is therefore not appropriate for universal expert
classes.
2One can even prove the following strong statement [HP05, Pol05]: If a strategy performs well
against an oblivious adversary which does not at all depend on our actions, then it also performs
well against an adaptive adversary.
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with− lnw∗ replaced by (something larger than) 1/w∗. Hence they are exponentially
larger in w∗, and one can show that this is sharp in general.
Increasing horizon. If the environment is reactive, it is not sufficient to consider
only the short-term performance of the selected expert i. This was first recognized
by [dFM04], who considered the repeated game of “Prisoner’s Dilemma” and the
“tit for tat” opponent as a motivating example (see Section 4 for details). In this
case, a good long term strategy is cooperating (because of the particular opponent).
However defecting is dominant, i.e. the instantaneous loss of defecting is always
smaller than that of cooperating. So in order to notice that an expert (for instance
the always cooperating one) performs well, we have to evaluate it at least over two
time steps. In general, if we evaluate a chosen expert over an increasing number of
time steps, we hope that we perform well in arbitrary reactive environments. This
means that the master works at a different time scale τ : in its τth time step, it
gives the control to the selected expert for Bτ ≥ 1 time steps (in the original time
scale t). As a consequence, the instantaneous losses which the master observes are
no longer uniformly bounded in [0, 1], but in [0, Bτ ]. Fortunately, it turns out that
the analysis remains valid if Bτ grows unboundedly but slowly enough. Only the
convergence rate of the average master’s loss to the optimum is affected: we will
obtain a final rate of t−1/10. The resulting algorithm FoE (for a finite expert class) is
specified in Figure 2 together with its subroutine FPL. We may have instantaneous
and cumulative losses in both time scales, this is always clear from the notation (e.g.
ℓit vs. ℓˆ
i
<τ ). Not surprisingly, most of FoE works in the master time scale.
Note that FoE makes use of its observation only if he decided to explore, i.e.
if rτ = 1. This seems an unnecessary waste of information. This is motivated
from the analysis, since FoE needs an unbiased loss estimate ℓˆ (with respect to
FoE ’s randomization). We just chose the simplest way to guarantee this. For the
simulations, we concentrate on the following faster learning variant : approximate
the probability piτ of the selected expert i (jointly for exploration and exploitation)
by a Monte-Carlo simulation. Then always learn a (close to) unbiased estimate
ℓˆiτ =
ℓiτ
piτ
. The analysis of FoE works in the same way for this modification, however
not resulting in better bounds. On the other hand, we will see that modified FoE
learns faster.
In case of a non-uniform prior and possibly infinitely many experts, the explo-
ration must be according to the prior weights. This causes another problem: FoE ’s
loss estimates ℓˆ need to be bounded, which forbids exploring experts with very small
prior weights. Hence we define for each expert i, an entering time T i ≥ 1 (at the
master time scale). Then FoE (including its subroutine FPL) is modified such that
it uses only active experts from {i : τ ≥ T i}. This guarantees additionally that we
have only a finite active set in each step, and the algorithm remains computationally
feasible.
Theorem 2 (Performance of FoE) Assume FoE acts in an online decision prob-
lem with bounded instantaneous losses ℓit ∈ [0, 1]. Let the exploration rate be γτ =
8
τ−1/4 and the learning rate be ητ = τ
−3/4. In case of uniform prior, choose Bτ =
⌊τ 1/8⌋. In case of arbitrary prior let Bτ = ⌊t
1/16⌋ and T i = ⌈(wi)−16⌉. Then in case
of uniform prior, for all experts i and all T ≥ 1 we have
1
T
EℓFoE1:T ≤
1
T
ℓi1:T +O(n
2T−1/10), and
1
T
ℓFoE1:T ≤
1
T
ℓi1:T +O(n
2T−1/10) w.p. 1− T−2.
Consequently, lim supT→∞
1
T
(ℓFoE1:T − ℓ
i
1:T ) ≤ 0 a.s. For non-uniform prior, corre-
sponding assertions hold with O-terms replaced by O(T−1/10 + (wi)−22T−1).
The proof of this main theorem on the performance of FoE can be found in
[PH05]. Similar bounds hold for larger Bτ < τ
1
4 . These bounds are improvable
[Pol05], and it is possible to prove any regret bound O
(
( 1
wi
)c+(log 1
wi
)T
2
3
+ε
)
, at the
cost of increasing c where ε → 0. In the simulations, we used Bτ = τ
0.24 for faster
learning. For playing 2×2 matrix games, we will use the class of all 16 deterministic
four-state Markov experts. That is, each expert consists of a lookup table with all
the actions for each of the 4 possible combination of moves in the last round. In the
first round, the expert plays uniformly random. (Compare the standard results on
learning matrix games with expert advice by [FS99].)
4 Simulations
As already indicated, it is our goal to explore and compare the performance of the
two universal learning approaches presented so far, in particular for problems which
are not solved by passive or greedy learners. To this aim, repeated 2 × 2 matrix
games are well suited:
• they are simple, such that (close to) universal learning is computationally
feasible even with brute-force implementation;
• they provide situations where optimal long-term behavior significantly differs
from greedy behavior (e.g. Prisoner’s Dilemma);
• moreover, we can observe how universal learners can exploit potentially weak
adversaries;
• and finally, we can test the two universal learners against each other.
We begin by describing the experimental setup and the universal learners. After
that, we will discuss five 2 × 2 matrix games, presenting experimental results and
highlighting their interesting aspects.
Setup. A 2 × 2 matrix game consists of two matrices R1, R2 ∈ R
2×2, the first one
containing rewards for the row player, the second one rewards for the column player.
(It does not cause any problem that for convenience, we have developed the theory
9
0 1
0 1,1 4,0
1 0,4 2,3
Prisoner’s Dilemma
0 1
0 2,2 3,0
1 0,3 4,4
Stag Hunt
0 1
0 0,0 4,1
1 1,4 2,2
Chicken
0 1
0 2,4 0,0
1 0,0 4,2
Battle of Sexes
0 1
0 4,0 0,4
1 0,4 4,0
Matching Pennies
Figure 3: Reward Matrices
in terms of losses rather than rewards: one may be transformed into the other by
simply inverting the sign. So for the discussion of the results, we will keep the
rewards, as this is more standard in game theory.) A single game proceeds in the
following way: the first player chooses a row action i ∈ {0, 1} and simultaneously
the second a column action j ∈ {0, 1}, both players without knowing the opponent’s
move. Then reward Rk(i, j) is payed to player k (k = 1, 2), and i and j are revealed
to both players. A repeated game consists of T single games. We chose T = 20000, if
at least one opponent is FoE (which has slow learning dynamics, as we will see), and
T = 100 for the fast learning AIξ (unless it is plotted in the same graph as FoE ). If
at least one randomized player participates, the run is repeated 10 times, and usually
the average is shown. We will consider only symmetric games, where one player,
when put in the position of the other player (i.e. when exchanging R1 and R2), has
a symmetric strategy (maybe after exchanging the actions). We will meet precisely
three types of symmetry: in the “Matching Pennies”, R1 = R2 after inverting the
action of the row player, and in the “Battle of Sexes” game, R1 = R2 after inverting
both players’ actions, and in all other games we R1 = R
T
2 (transpose). In these
latter games, we will call the action 0 “defect” and 1 “cooperate”. All games we
consider have rewards in {0 . . . 4}. The AIξ and FoE agents are used as specified in
the previous sections, with the classes of all two-state Markov environments and all
deterministic four-state Markov experts, respectively. For AIξ, we will concentrate
the presentation on the almost consistent horizon variant, since it performs always
better than the moving horizon variant. For FoE , we will concentrate on the faster
learning variant.
Prisoner’s Dilemma. This dilemma is classical. The reward matrices are R1 =(
14
03
)
and R2 = R
T
1 , with the following interpretation: The two players are accused
of a crime they have committed together. They are being interrogated separately.
Each player can either cooperate with the other player (don’t tell the cops anything),
or he defects (tells the cops everything but blame the colleague). The punishments
are according to the players’ joint decision: if none of them gives evidence, both get
a minor sentence. If one gives evidence and the other one keeps quiet, the traitor
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gets free, while the other gets a huge sentence. If both give evidence, then they both
get a significant sentence. (There is also an easier variant “Deadlock” which we not
discuss.)
It is clear that giving evidence, i.e. defecting, is an instantaneously dominant
action: regardless of what the opponent does, the immediate reward is always larger
for defecting. However, if both players would agree to cooperate, this is the “social
optimum” and guarantees the better long-term reward in the repeated game. A well-
known instance for this case is playing against the “tit for tat” strategy strategy
which cooperates in the first move and subsequently performs the action we did in
the previous move. Similar but harder to learn are “two tit for tat” and “three
tit for tat”, which defect in the first move and cooperate only if we cooperated two
respectively three times in a row. Note that although “two tit for tat” and “three tit
for tat” are not in AIξ’s model class, probabilistic versions of the strategies are: if the
probability of “adversary defected, I cooperate, then the adversary will cooperate in
the next round” is chosen correctly (namely 1
2
for 2-tit for tat and ≈ 0.57 for 3-tit
for tat), then the expected number of rounds I have to cooperate until the adversary
will do so is 2 respectively 3.
Figure 4 shows that in most cases, AIξ learns very quickly the best actions.
(This is the consistent horizon variant, the moving horizon variant will be discussed
with the next game, Stag Hunt.) If the opponent is memoryless as for example the
uniform random player, AIξ constantly defects after short time. Against tit for tat
and two tit for tat, AIξ cooperates after short time. The figure shows the average
per round rate of cooperation, which after a few exploratory moves converges to
the optimal action as 1
t
. However, AIξ does not learn to cooperate against three
tit for tat. The reason is the general problem that in order to increase exploration,
AIξ needs exponential depth of the expectimin tree. Assume that a certain action
sequence of length n is favorable against the true environment, which has however
not too high a current weight. In this instance, cooperating three times in a row is
favorable against (the probabilistic version of) 3-tit for tat. In order to recognize that
this is worth exploring, AIξ has to build a branch of depth n = 3 in the expectimin
tree, which has (because of the relatively low prior weight) very small probability
∼ exp(−n) however. Then it needs an exponentially large subtree below this branch
to accumulate enough (virtual) reward in order to encourage exploration.
One more problem arises when AIξ plays against another AIξ. Here, the perfectly
symmetric setting results in both playing the same actions in each move, hence they
are not correctly learning. We might try to remedy this by varying the tree depth
of the second AIξ (denoted AIξ2 in the figure), however it turns out that in this
case, both AIξ’s do not learn at all to cooperate (see [Hut04, Sec.8.5.2] for a possible
reason).
We now turn to the performance of FoE (the faster learning variant) as evaluated
in Figure 5. As expected, FoE learns much slower than AIξ (note the different time
scale). On the other hand, its exploration is strong enough to learn 3-tit for tat (and
even harder instances). When playing against another instance of FoE , we notice
11
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Figure 4: AIξ in Prisoner’s Dilemma
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Figure 5: FoE (and AIξ) in Prisoner’s
Dilemma
however that they usually do not succeed to overcome the dominance of mutual
defection. Also when FoE competes with AIξ, they tend to learn mutual defection
rather than cooperation. (Sometimes, they learn cooperation in one or two of the
possible states of the MDP.)
Stag Hunt. This game is also known as “Assurance”. The reward matrices are
R1 =
(
23
04
)
and R2 = R
T
1 . Two players are hunting together. If they cooperate, they
will catch the stag. However, one player might not trust the other, in which case he
chases rabbits on his own instead. In this case, the other one won’t get anything if
he tries to cooperate. If both defect, then they are in conflict, and each player gets
less rabbits. Although the optimum for both players is to cooperate, they need to
trust each other sufficiently. If one player plays uniformly random, it is better for
the other to go for the rabbits. Also, defecting has the lower variance.
Maybe it is surprising to observe that AIξ (with a depth of 8) does not learn
to cooperate against 2-tit for tat (Figure 6). The reason is that defecting has a
relatively good payoff, and therefore exploration is not encouraged as discussed
in the previous subsection. If the depth of the tree is increased to 9, AIξ learns
cooperation against 2-tit for tat (but not against 3-tit for tat). We also see that the
moving horizon variant of AIξ has even more problems with exploration: It does
not learn cooperating against 2-tit for tat, even with depth 9. The explanation is
that even if AIξ decides to explore in one time step, in the next step this exploration
might not be correctly continued, as the tree is now explored to a different level. This
observation can also be made for the Prisoner‘s Dilemma. In fact, the consistent
horizon variant performs always better than moving horizon.
As before, FoE learns much slower but explores more robustly (Figure 7), neither
2- nor 3-tit for tat are a problem. Unlike in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, if AIξ and FoE
are competing, they learn mutual cooperation in almost half of the cases, an average
over such lucky instances is given in the figure. The same is valid for FoE against
FoE , while AIξ against AIξ has the same symmetry problem as already observed
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The original slower learning variant of FoE reaches the
same average level of performance only after 105 time steps instead of 2 · 104 steps,
and moreover with a variance twice as high.
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Chicken. The reward matrices R1 =
(
04
12
)
and R2 = R
T
1 of the “Chicken” game
(also known as “Hawk and Dove”) can be interpreted as follows: Two coauthors
write a paper, but each tries to spend as little effort as possible. If one succeeds to
let the other do the whole work, he has a high reward. On the other hand, if no one
does anything, there will be no paper and thus no reward. Finally, if both decide to
cooperate, both get some reward. Here, in the repeated game, it is socially optimal
to take turns cooperating and defecting.3 Still the best situation for one player is if
he emerges as the “dominant defector”, defecting in most or all of the games, while
the other one cooperates.
If the opponent steadily alternates between cooperating and defecting, then AIξ
quickly learns to adapt. This can be observed in Figure 8, where the performance
is given in terms of average per round reward instead of cooperation rate. How-
ever, AIξ is not obstinate enough to perform well against a “stubborn” adversary
that would cooperate only after his opponent has defected for three successive time
steps. Here, AIξ learns to cooperate, leaving his opponent the favorable role as the
dominant defector. (However, AIξ learns to dominate the less stubborn adversary
which cooperates after two defecting actions.) When two AIξs play against each
other, they again have the symmetry problem. Interestingly, if we break symmetry
by giving the second AIξ a depth of 9, he will turn out the dominant defector (not
shown in the graph).
FoE behaves differently in this game (Figure 9). While he learns to deal with
the steadily alternating adversary and emerges as the dominant defector against the
stubborn one, he would give precedence to AIξ in most cases. This is not hard
to explain, since FoE in the beginning plays essentially random. Thus AIξ learns
quickly to defect, and for FoE remains nothing but learning to cooperate. However,
this does not always happen: In the minority of the cases, FoE defects enough such
that AIξ decides to cooperate, and FoE will be the dominant defector. (Hence the
average shown in the graph is less clear in favor of AIξ.)
3We assume that the authors are not very good at cooperating, and that the costs of cooperating
more than compensate for the synergy. We could assign a reward of 3 instead of 2 to mutual
cooperation. This is the less interesting situation of “Easy Chicken”, where cooperating is the
optimal long-term strategy like in the previous games.
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Figure 11: AIξ and FoE in Matching
Pennies
Battle of Sexes. In this game, a married couple wants to spend the evening
together, but they didn’t settle if they would go to the theater (her preference) or the
pub (his preference). However, if they fail to meet, both have a boring evening (and
no reward at all). The reward matrices are R1 =
(
20
04
)
and R2 =
(
40
02
)
. Coordination
is clearly important in the repeated game. Like in “Chicken”, taking turns is a social
optimum, while it is best for one player if his choice becomes dominant.
In Figure 10, our universal learners show similar performance like in the Chicken
game. Both learn to deal with an alternating partner. FoE also learns to dominate
over a stubborn adversary which plays his less favorite action only after the opponent
insists three times on that. AIξ is dominated by this stubborn player. However, AIξ
always dominates FoE . Finally, in contrast to the Chicken game, AIξ against AIξ
does not have the symmetry problem, but they both learn to alternate.
Matching Pennies. Each player conceals in his palm a coin with either heads
or tails up. They are revealed simultaneously. If they match (both heads or both
tails), the first player wins, otherwise the second. This is the only zero-sum game of
the games we consider, where R1 =
(
40
04
)
and R2 =
(
04
40
)
. Thus, there is a minimax
strategy for both players, which is actually uniform random play. On the other
hand, deterministic repeated play is potentially exploitable by the adversary.
Figure 11 shows the results for this last game we present. Both AIξ and FoE
learn to exploit a predictable adversary, namely the player alternating between 0 and
1. The other games are balanced in the long run, only in the beginning AIξ succeeds
to exploit FoE a little. If two AIξs compete, it is important to break symmetry, then
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both learn to alternate (this situation is shown in the graph). If symmetry is not
broken, the row player (who tries to match) always wins.
5 Discussion
Altogether, universal learners perform well in repeated matrix games. They usually
learn to prefer the optimal long-term action to greedy behavior (Prisoner’s Dilemma
and Stag Hunt). If possible they are able to exploit a predictable adversary (Match-
ing Pennies). And they learn good strategies when it is necessary to foresee the
opponent’s action (Chicken and Battle of Sexes). Of the two approaches we pre-
sented and compared, AIξ learns much faster than FoE , but FoE explores more
thoroughly. Of course, there is a trade-off between exploration and fast learning.
Interestingly, it may depend on the adversary (and thus on the environment) if fast
learning or exploration is the better long-term strategy: In Chicken and Battle of
Sexes, AIξ profits against FoE by learning fast and dictating its preferred action,
but looses against the stubborn opponent because of not exploring enough.
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